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Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) face one common challenge when integrating with 
the existing manned aircraft population in the National Airspace System (NAS). To unlock the 
full efficiency of UAS, the UAS integrator must comply with an onboard pilot’s requirement to 
see-and-avoid other aircraft while operating. Commercially available Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) 
sensor technologies have been developed to attempt to comply with this requirement. UAS 
integrators must use these sensors to meet or exceed the performance of a human pilot. This 
thesis covers research done to integrate an array of commercially made DAA sensors with a 
large Group 3 UAS both in hardware and software that was later flight tested and evaluated for 
usability. A fast-time simulation is presented using the principles of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration’s (NASA) Detect-and-AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems 
(DAIDALUS). Last, open-source tools are presented to assist future integrators in validating 





Many individuals contributed to the overall inspiration that guided me to focus on 
unmanned aircraft. From professors to family members, I could not have had a more supportive 
group pushing me forward to be my best. Although an endless list of individuals did contribute 
to who I am now as a researcher and engineer, the domino effect in my career can truly be 
attributed to a sole catalyst. I would like to dedicate the last two years of fun and insightful 
research to my friend and long-time motivator Arianna.  
I would also like to dedicate this work to those student researchers who have come along 
for the ride. Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight (BVLOS) for unmanned aircraft is a constantly 
moving goal post with exciting challenges at every corner. Thank you to the students for pushing 
me to be a better leader and educator as we all come to learn the intricacies of this exciting field 
unique to the aerospace industry. I will continue to dream of the day where I get to see our birds 
flying BVLOS along the highways I travel every weekend.  
I further dedicate this work to the individuals of the future who will get the opportunity to 
see these amazing aircraft in action, hundreds of miles away from their pilots. Surely the 
integration of unmanned aviation will inspire the next generations of engineers that get to accept 
the norm of unmanned aircraft leaving packages at their doorsteps.  





I would like to acknowledge the skill and leadership of the personnel at Raspet Flight 
Research Laboratory (RFRL). From program management to flight operations, the organization 
is truly living up to its historic namesake.  
I would like to acknowledge and thank Caden Teer, RFRL’s Chief Engineer, for trusting 
me with the autonomy to build a team to do great and inspiring research within BVLOS. His 
integration and aerodynamics expertise have enabled the engineering team in many ways.  
The Aerospace Engineering Department at Mississippi State University has enabled me 
to do the work I have dreamed of for many years. I would like to acknowledge Dr. Davy Belk 
and the Aerospace Faculty for allowing me to do the work I enjoy as well as coordinate the 
student research program. The team at Raspet will continue to support and collaborate with the 
engineering departments as the organization grows. 
Last, I would like to thank Dr. Cheng, Dr. Kim, and Dr. Sescu. It has been a very 
unconventional two years of graduate school and I wish to thank you all for letting me finish this 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1 
1.1 Purpose ..................................................................................................................3 
II. BACKGROUND ...............................................................................................................4 
2.1 Unmanned Aircraft System Grouping ...................................................................4 
2.2 Unmanned Aircraft System Use Cases ..................................................................5 
2.3 Part 107 and CFR 91.113 ......................................................................................5 
2.4 Detect-and-Avoid ..................................................................................................6 
2.5 Detect-and-Avoid Technologies ............................................................................8 
2.5.2 Optical Systems ...............................................................................................9 
2.5.3 Radar Systems ...............................................................................................10 
2.5.4 Acoustic Systems ...........................................................................................11 
2.5.5 Lidar ..............................................................................................................12 
2.5.6 Summary of Sensors ......................................................................................13 
III. DETECT-AND-AVOID SIMULATION ........................................................................14 
3.1 Simulation Background .......................................................................................14 
3.1.2 Terminal Airspace Encounter Data Set .........................................................15 
3.1.2.2 Example File ............................................................................................18 
3.1.3 Monte Carlo Methods ....................................................................................19 
3.1.4 DAIDALUS ...................................................................................................20 
3.1.5 Encounter Set Metadata .................................................................................22 
3.1.5.1 Risk Ratios ...............................................................................................23 
3.1.5.2 Closest Point of Approach .......................................................................24 
3.1.5.3 Horizontal and Vertical Miss Distances ..................................................25 
3.2 Simulation Framework ........................................................................................26 
 
v 
3.2.2 Sensor Model .................................................................................................29 
3.2.3 Detection Methodology .................................................................................31 
3.2.4 Prediction Methodology ................................................................................32 
3.2.5 Avoidance Methodology ...............................................................................32 
3.3 Simulation Results ...............................................................................................32 
3.3.2 Terminal Airspace Encounter Examples .......................................................34 
3.3.3 Detect, Predict, and Avoid Examples ............................................................36 
IV. DAA SYSTEM INTEGRATION ....................................................................................39 
4.1 System of Systems ...............................................................................................39 
4.1.1 Detect Function .............................................................................................40 
4.1.2 Alert Function ................................................................................................41 
4.1.3 Avoid Function ..............................................................................................41 
4.2 Hardware Integration ...........................................................................................42 
4.2.1 Radar Array ...................................................................................................42 
4.3 Software Integration ............................................................................................43 
4.3.1 Software Overview ........................................................................................44 
4.3.2 Radar Control ................................................................................................45 
4.3.2.1 Altitude Masking .....................................................................................46 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION .............47 
5.1 Future DAA Technology .....................................................................................47 
5.2 Simulation Gaps ..................................................................................................47 
5.3 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................48 
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................49 
APPENDIX 
A. MATLAB SIMULATION SOURCE CODE ..................................................................51 
A.1 Main .....................................................................................................................53 
A.2 User Inputs Class .................................................................................................58 
A.3 predictKinTrack function ....................................................................................59 
A.4 loadEncounterFile Function ................................................................................60 
A.5 dtmLoWC Function .............................................................................................61 
A.6 checkProbDetection Function .............................................................................62 
A.7 checkSensor_v02 Function ..................................................................................62 
A.8 addSensorError Function .....................................................................................63 
A.9 checkBands Function ...........................................................................................64 
A.10 calcRelHdg Function ...........................................................................................65 
A.11 calcKinBands Function .......................................................................................66 
B. OPEN-SOURCE TOOLS FOR UAS INTEGRATORS .................................................67 
 
vi 
B.1 MIT Lincoln Laboratory Datasets .......................................................................68 
B.2 MIT Lincoln Laboratory Bayesian Network Models ..........................................69 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 UAS classification by size and speed by the United States Department of 
Defense. ........................................................................................................................4 
Table 3.1 Intruder Encounter File Data. .....................................................................................18 
Table 3.2 Ownship Encounter File Data. ...................................................................................19 
Table 3.3 Risk Ratios for Loss of Well Clear and Near Mid-Air Collision for Terminal 
Airspace Encounter Set without Mitigation. ..............................................................24 
Table 3.4 Mitigated Risk Ratios over one million encounters in Terminal Class D 
airspace. ......................................................................................................................33 
Table B.1 Types of aircraft models, both conventional and unconventional, provided by 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 DAA Sensors Compared by Multiple Characteristics (S.B. Hottman). .......................8 
Figure 2.2 Iris Long Range Camera (left) and 360-degree Multi-Camera Solution 
(right). Images taken from (Iris Automation Inc.) ......................................................10 
Figure 2.3 EchoFlight Airborne Radar (left) and Fortem TrueView R20 (right). .......................11 
Figure 2.4 SARA Inc.’s PANCAS Airborne DAA System Installed on a sUAS ........................12 
Figure 3.1 Example Monte Carlo Framework Provided by MIT LL. Figure credit to 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology). ...................................................................14 
Figure 3.2 Airport used in the Generation of Terminal Data Set Encounters. Satellite 
Image of the Airfield (left) and SkyVector Sectional (right) .....................................16 
Figure 3.3 Scatter Plot of Intruder Aircraft Starting Positions ....................................................17 
Figure 3.4 Starting position of UAS ownship in encounter set ...................................................18 
Figure 3.5 Monte Carlo Method passing three diverse probability distributions through a 
model to output a solution with standard deviation and a reliability curve. 
(Wittwer, 2004) ..........................................................................................................20 
Figure 3.6 NASA’s DAIDALUS algorithm visualizing possible safe trajectories in an 
encounter with an intruder aircraft. ............................................................................21 
Figure 3.7 Closest Point of Approach for One Million Unmitigated Encounters between 
an Unmanned Aircraft and a Manned Aircraft near Class D Terminal 
Airspace. .....................................................................................................................25 
Figure 3.8 Scatter plot of Horizontal Miss Distance in feet on the horizontal axis and 
Vertical Miss Distance in feet on the vertical axis. ....................................................26 
Figure 3.9 Detect-and-Avoid Simulation Flow Diagram. ...........................................................28 
Figure 3.10 Plot of radar detection based on range. Range values are on the horizontal 
axis in feet and detection probability between 0 and 100 percent are on the 
vertical axis. ................................................................................................................30 
 
ix 
Figure 3.11 Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. Ownship trajectory 
marked in yellow and intruder trajectory marked in red. ...........................................34 
Figure 3.12 Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. Ownship trajectory 
marked in yellow and intruder trajectory marked in red. ...........................................35 
Figure 3.13 Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. .........................................35 
Figure 3.14 Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. .........................................36 
Figure 3.15 Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. Ownship trajectory 
marked in blue and intruder trajectory marked in red. In this case, the intruder 
came within the FOV of the sensor and predictions for both intruder, cyan 
dashes, and ownship, yellow dashes, were generated. ...............................................37 
Figure 3.16 Two aircraft trajectories in an intercepting encounter within terminal 
airspace. Intruder path in red, and ownship path in blue. After each detection 
of the intruder, the predicted path of the ownship, in magenta hyphenated 
curves, and the predicted path of the intruder, in cyan hyphenated lines is 
shown. .........................................................................................................................38 
Figure 4.1 Radar array total coverage with two regions, marked 2 and 4 respectively, 
covered redundantly on either side of the nose. .........................................................43 
Figure 4.2 Overview of DAA software integration with an autopilot. ........................................44 
Figure 4.3 Software architecture overview for DAA sensor array. .............................................45 
Figure B.1 Total radar coverage of the Continental United States included within the 
Traffic Density Database. ...........................................................................................68 
Figure B.2 Track segments for a fixed-wing multi-engine FAA (USA) registered aircraft 







The past several decades have seen an explosion in technological growth and in particular 
automation. The market incentive to reduce manpower costs while improving efficiency has 
increased the concentration on the development of systems that may replace a human operator. 
Industrial plants turned to robotic arms for car manufacturing, Computer Numeric Control 
(CNC) and 3d printing. These machines have given creative access to the average consumer. In a 
similar sense, aviation has turned to unmanning aircraft. The accessibility, affordability, and ease 
of use inherent in small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) has led to a forecasted market 
growth of 30 billion dollars annually by 2035 (Wargo, Church and Glaneueski). This expansion 
and accessibility of the technology forced regulators to limit the use of sUAS in the National 
Airspace System (NAS). Part 107 is a rule in development to restrict the use of sUAS to certain 
airspace, altitudes, and operations. Remote pilots operating under this rule are responsible for the 
safety risks associated with flying an unmanned aircraft under 55 pounds, as misuse could lead to 
property damage or even fatal accidents. The primary responsibility of the UAS operator is to 
See-and-Avoid (SAA) intruder aircraft within the ownship’s airspace as stated in Call For 
Release (CFR) Part 91.113 which will be explained within this thesis. Unlike sUAS regulations, 
large UAS do not currently have a regulatory path forward for complying with the CFR Part 
91.113 requirement. These longer endurance, higher altitude-capable aircraft are more efficient 
for federal and commercial operators looking to cover long lines of infrastructure or loiter over 
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post-disaster areas. For large UAS operations to expand to Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight 
(BVLOS) operations like package delivery and linear inspection, Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) 
standards must be established and similarly met by operators. This responsibility to See-and-
Avoid while operating large UAS within the same airspace as manned aviation concerns the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), leading to multiple funds for research related to this 
issue. The budget for the FAA to conduct research and development related to airspace safety 
including UAS integration into the NAS was 512 million dollars as of fiscal year 2020 (Sarget, 
Harris and Cowan). The FAA allocated money to different research facilities to progress the 
availability of data to support decisive regulatory activities pertaining mainly to sUAS, leaving 
larger UAS as a future goal post. This leaves integrating a larger UAS into the NAS to be a 
considerable challenge when the regulatory documentation has yet to be codified.  
The FAA continues to work with both industry and researchers to make informed, data-
driven, and safe rules for UAS operators and air traffic managers before allowing the integration 
of UAS into the NAS. Many standards and safe practices must be established before operators 
may begin to fly their UAS BVLOS. The current practices for establishing a safety case for 
receiving an authorization to operate large UAS BVLOS are not concrete and mostly diverse. In 
this thesis research, a large UAS integrated with three flat panel radars is simulated within 
scripted encounters produced by Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory’s 
(MIT LL’s) open-source Bayesian network models for generating encounter trajectories. The 
simulation utilizes the kinematics approach similar to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administrations’s (NASA) Detect-and-AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems 
(DAIDALUS) and simplistic models for radar performance. The work done to integrate the radar 
array with a large UAS, and the necessary software development, will be overviewed. Open-
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source tools and a suggested simulation framework for future UAS integrators to validate their 
DAA solutions will also be presented. 
1.1 Purpose 
This thesis research brings many of the developing aspects of regulation, simulation, and 
validation together to inform the public and interested parties about the research being done on 
UAS with regards to DAA capabilities. There are many commercially available DAA systems, 
autopilots, unmanned aircraft, Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs), and BVLOS products. 
However, there still is much research to be done before the FAA may move forward with fully 
integrating UAS into the NAS. The following thesis will serve as a benchmark in the future 
development of this sector of aviation research, recording the to-date progress. Tools for industry 
and safety cases for regulators are still being developed concurrently alongside this thesis work. 
That being stated, this thesis will cover the current development both regulatory and in research, 
survey the present availability of DAA systems and their strengths and weaknesses, evaluate a 
conceptual framework of a DAA system integrated with a large UAS in simulation, expand on 
some of the research that was done to integrate an airborne radar array with a large UAS as part 
of this thesis, provide references to open-source tools for future UAS integrators, suggest a 
simulation framework for system validation, and finally speculate on the future of UAS 
integration into the NAS encompassing multiple future decision-making steps and avenues of 
possible research. Although the result of this thesis research is not the finalized authorization of a 
BVLOS-ready Group 3 UAS, it hopes to be a major inspiration for future applicators of DAA 
technology for specifically large UAS and be an informative guide for new researchers seeking 





2.1 Unmanned Aircraft System Grouping 
Unmanned Aircraft are divided into five categories This research focuses on Group 3 
UAS which is defined as aircraft less than 1,320 pounds but greater than 55 pounds that fly lower 
than 18,000 feet mean sea level at airspeeds less than 250 knots. The United States Department 
of Defense is responsible for this classification of the different tiers of UAS. 









Speed (kn) Representative UAS 
Group 1 0–20 < 1,200 AGL 100 RQ-11 Raven, WASP, Puma, 
Group 2 21–55 < 3,500 AGL 
< 250 
ScanEagle, Flexrotor, SIC5 
Group 3 < 1,320 
< FL 180 
V-BAT, RQ-7B Shadow, RQ-21 
Blackjack, Navmar RQ-23 Tigershark, 






MQ-8B Fire Scout, MQ-1A/B 
Predator, MQ-1C Gray Eagle 




2.2 Unmanned Aircraft System Use Cases 
The unmanned sector of aviation comprises recreational pilots, part 107 commercial 
pilots, and those flying for missions for the national agencies. Although UAS has its roots in 
military applications, the availability of UAS as well as the increase in technological capabilities 
of sensors has broadened to potential pool of use cases. Inspection of linear infrastructure like 
power lines and railways, as well as agricultural mapping and crop inspection are two of the 
many possible uses of UAS. Multispectral and hyperspectral cameras have been fitted and down-
sized to meet the UAS platform’s low cost, size, weight, and power (C-SWaP) requirements, 
allowing for operators to develop new business models around these use cases. 
2.3 Part 107 and CFR 91.113 
After a surge of sUAS entering the NAS from the early 2000s to recent, the FAA came 
out with a rule for certifying remote pilots and commercial operators. This rule, Part 107, applies 
to operators with a “small drone that is less than 55 pounds” (FAA) flying for work or business. 
Included in Part 107 is limitations for flying over people, in certain airspaces and nighttime 
operation. In order to fly BVLOS, a Part 107 waiver must be authorized by the FAA. To obtain 
this waiver, an operator may go through the Part 107 Waiver application process which 
encompasses explaining to the FAA how a waived part of the Part 107 rules will not seriously 
affect the safety-focused intent of the limitations on sUAS operations. Once a waiver is 
approved, a sUAS operator may fly without whichever limitation or part of the rule that was 
waived. This process has been in the works for several years, and a few Part 107 authorizations 
for BVLOS have been made by the FAA for certain operators. However, there is currently no 
process by which a large UAS may receive authorization to fly BVLOS. Currently, large UAS 
operators may operate under Part 91, which regulates general operating and flight rules used 
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most consistently in general aviation. To enable BVLOS operations for these larger craft would 
mean the authorization of an alternate means of meeting CFR Part 91.113(b) which states: 
General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is 
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be 
maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. 
When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give 
way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear. 
A pilot operating under Part 91 is responsible for seeing and avoiding other aircraft while 
maintaining a sufficient well clear self-separation from intruders within the pilot’s airspace. 
Since unmanned aircraft have no pilot onboard, the remote pilot is responsible for fulfilling this 
role. Although, once a UAS is out of the line-of-sight or at such a distance that the remote pilot 
can no longer effectively mitigate self-separation violations, then an onboard system or system of 
systems must step in. Commonly, DAA sensors try to fill this safety gap with complex solutions 
to replacing equivalently what can be referred to as the pilot in the cockpit. To receive BVLOS 
authorization for a large Group 3 UAS, the safety case of these sensors must be proven. 
2.4 Detect-and-Avoid 
An aspect of UAS that is of great interest to the unmanned sector of aviation is DAA and 
how it may enable the capabilities of operators to fly BVLOS. The premise of DAA is to replace 
the requirement of the pilot to See-and-Avoid other aircraft and make conscious maneuvers to 
avoid the intruder aircraft while flying. DAA systems range from radar to lidar and are intended 
to integrate with a UAS’ autopilot for the purpose of meeting or exceeding that requirement. 
Some studies have modelled the pilot visual acquisition model which intends to describe the 
capability of any pilot to see an aircraft as well as predict their performance at various distances 
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and angles. These models have influenced the regulators’ decisions resulting in the establishment 
of risk and mitigation metrics. 
The DAA system, integrated with the ownship aircraft, is responsible for maintaining a 
Well Clear Volume (WCV) around the aircraft. The current revision of the volume extends 
horizontally 2,000 ft and vertically 250 ft in both directions (Weinart, Campbell and Vela). The 
resulting “hockey puck” shape centered around the ownship intends to be a measure of adequate 
self-separation. Similarly, a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) cylinder is defined as 500 ft 
horizontally and 100 ft vertically. For comparison between performance of pilots and DAA 
systems, a normalized statistic needs to be identified and accepted. A Risk Ratio (RR) serves to 
quantify safety of interaction between aircraft during the length of an encounter. The RR itself 
can be calculated as the number of times the WCV or NMAC is violated during several 
encounters divided by the total number of encounters within a set.  
 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑊𝐶 =











Basically, a RR can be a ratio of safety mitigation given the addition of onboard sensing 
systems or procedural mitigations taken by the operator. RRs and their relevance to both flight 
testing and encounter simulation are explained later within this document. 
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2.5 Detect-and-Avoid Technologies 
Passive and active sensors have the capability of being multi-use, specifically in aiding 
the UAS in detecting an intruder in the airspace and giving the autopilot necessary information to 
calculate an avoidance maneuver that will deconflict the encounter. Although most sensors 
perform well at close ranges, the WCV with a horizontal range of 2,000 feet is a major obstacle 
for DAA sensor manufacturers. The necessity of the ownship to stay 2,000 feet from intruding 
aircraft is due to the short amount of time it takes a manned general aviation aircraft to travel 
2,000 feet and fly into the near mid-air collision (NMAC) volume, causing a potential accident. 
Sensors to be used for DAA must also meet the low C-SWaP requirements of the potentially 
used platform. Therefore, the DAA manufacturers have sought out low power solutions such as 
EO/IR optics. Radars are generally regarded as power-hungry devices, but companies like 
Echodyne and Fortem Technologies have found a way to decrease the sensor size and 
requirements in such a way to be a payload even for sUAS. Lidar provides highly accurate short 
range point cloud data but struggles with meeting the 2,000 feet range. Last, an acoustic system 
manufactured by SARA, Inc. has the potential of fulfilling DAA requirements for BVLOS. The 
below Figure 2.1 from a FAA report highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each sensor type 
(S.B. Hottman). The following section highlights some of these currently available DAA 
technologies. 
 
Figure 2.1 DAA Sensors Compared by Multiple Characteristics (S.B. Hottman). 
EO Yes No No No ?? Yes Yes 4? Yes No No Yes Yes
Human Visual Yes No No No No No No 2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes
IR Search and Track Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 22+ No Yes ?? Yes Yes
Passive IR Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 22+ No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Radar Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 22+ No No Yes Yes No
TCAS/ACAS No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 22+ No No No Yes No































2.5.2 Optical Systems 
Although optical sensors have been around in many forms for decades, the premise of 
using cameras as the basis of collision avoidance is relatively new. Some automated ground 
vehicles use camera systems to identify obstacles and make decisions about how to avoid them. 
However, this obstacle avoidance concept is relatively new to the unmanned aviation sector, and 
at the forefront of DAA for BVLOS operations is the company Iris Automation. This 
manufacturer has targeted sUAS and advertises a BVLOS product. This product includes 
multiple long-range cameras, approximately 4,000 ft in detection range, and a module capable of 
determining avoidance maneuvers and conversing them with the autopilot. The system provides 
an interface and display for clearly communicating to the operator the relative bearing and range 
of an intruder once the target is identified. The single-camera system can be seen in Figure 2.2 as 
well as the 360-degree solution utilizing five cameras with 80-degree azimuth and 50-degree 
elevation field-of-view (FOV). The manufacturer integrated artificial intelligence for classifying 
the intruding aircraft which may help with decision-making in the short time between detection 
and closest point of approach. Overall, the Casia optical solution for DAA appears to be a viable 
choice for operators seeking a BVLOS waiver or authorization for their Part 107 flights. The 
system does face challenges when trying to meet customer needs for all-weather operations as 




Figure 2.2 Iris Long Range Camera (left) and 360-degree Multi-Camera Solution (right). 
Images taken from (Iris Automation Inc.) 
 
2.5.3 Radar Systems 
Ground-based radar is a proven and historically pivotal technology used for detecting and 
tracking airborne targets. Similarly, airborne radar dates to the mid-20th century. Therefore, it is 
no surprise that the technology has been downsized, optimized for low power, and available for 
integration with UAS. On the forefront of radar based DAA solutions are Echodyne and Fortem 
Technologies. Echodyne’s metamaterial electronically scanning array (MESA) radar is unique to 
their system although Fortem’s products use a similarly computer steered antenna array. There 
are no publicly released comparisons of the two systems, so only their core characteristics are 
discussed in this paper. Echodyne’s airborne flat panel EchoFlight is capable of 120-degrees of 
horizontal coverage and 80-degrees elevation.  Fortem Technology offers a family of radar 
solutions. One is the larger R30 while the other is the more compact R20 radar. The horizontal 
performance is identical to the previous flat panel radar, but the elevation range is exactly half. 
Radar solutions have advantages in their all-weather operation capabilities as the RF energy can 
travel the air and return to the receiver with little to no obstruction caused by light rain and haze. 
Therefore, as mentioned in the FAA report on DAA systems, radar will be a viable component 




Figure 2.3 EchoFlight Airborne Radar (left) and Fortem TrueView R20 (right). 
 
2.5.4 Acoustic Systems 
Passive sensors range in their concepts, such as optical and passive radar. There also 
exists a passive acoustic sensor, that can drown out the ownship noise and listen for nearby air 
traffic while airborne. SARA, Inc. has developed the Passive Acoustic Non-Cooperative 
Collision Avoidance System (PANCAS) that can detect the low frequencies emissions from 
general aviation aircraft and determine a bearing and distance to establish a track. The system 
was tested in the FAA Pathfinder report and found to be capable of tracking all types of aircraft 
as far out as 5 nautical miles (Ferguson). This sensor seems to be very promising in the future of 
enabling BVLOS for UAS as its low power and physical signature are attractive to potential 
customers. In the below Figure 2.4, the PANCAS system is installed on a small UAS. The 
microphone array can be seen attached to the top of each motor at the end of the arms of the 
aircraft frame. Like the optical DAA solutions, the PANCAS acoustic sensor may not perform 




Figure 2.4 SARA Inc.’s PANCAS Airborne DAA System Installed on a sUAS 
 
2.5.5 Lidar 
Lidar is an active sensor, sending pulses of light outward and collecting information on 
the reflection of the sensor’s environment to determine range. The output data from this sensor is 
commonly referred to a point cloud. The point cloud is a multidimensional matrix that represents 
the returns of the sensor, generally in a three-dimensional form. Other sensors can similarly 
create point clouds, but because of lidar’s 360-degree field-of-view and large elevation 
capabilities, the amount of data returned is significantly higher. Therefore, it is common to see 
lidar output be organized into such a form. Inherent to the shear amount of data is the necessity 
for onboard processing to be substantial. Not all UAS can support this data transfer rate so 
usually an additional processing system is needed. Unfortunately, the high accuracy and airspace 
awareness capabilities of lidar are bogged down by the lack of range. For DAA systems, range is 
of highest importance. Lidar sensors could potentially complement close ranges for applications 
like urban commerce, but currently are incapable of fulfilling the range requirements of DAA. 
Therefore, lidar systems will not be represented in this research, but if future lidar systems can 
span past the 2,000 ft WCV horizontal range, then application of these active sensors may be 
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revisited. For now, lidar serves as a highly accurate and viable sensor solution for short-range 
obstacle avoidance. 
2.5.6 Summary of Sensors 
The aforementioned sensors inherently have advantages and disadvantages. Radar can 
see through most inclement weather with great accuracy, optical sensors can use artificial 
intelligence to characterize the intruder and make assumptions about future behavior, and passive 
sensors like acoustic have low physical footprints and power consumption. Small UAS do not 
generally have the power budget to support a multi-sensor suite for DAA, especially when their 
primary payload may be a high-powered multispectral payload. On the other hand, most large 
UAS have generators and the capability to support multiple payloads. The trade space for DAA 
solutions for BVLOS operations also includes flight times, structural strength, and software 
compatibility. In this thesis research, a large fixed-wing UAS will be considered, thus 
eliminating any potential power consumption obstacles in integration. The large UAS will also 
be assumed to be physically capable of supporting multiple low C-SWaP DAA payloads and 
software compatibility will be addressed with an additional onboard mission computer that can 
communicate synchronously with the DAA systems with adequate data transfer speed. The DAA 
solution will be a heterogenous culmination of some of the previously mentioned sensors. This 
multi-sensor suite will benefit from the advantages of each system, and in some instances, the 
FOV of each sensor may overlap thus providing beneficial double coverage of that area. Overall, 
this multi-sensor suite will theoretically provide adequate coverage beyond the WCV and will 
provide the large UAS with ample time to determine the safest maneuver to deconflict the 





3.1 Simulation Background 
Monte Carlo or ‘fast-time’ simulation provides a statistical representation of both worst- 
and best-case scenarios for a given application. The Monte Carlo method uses an iterative 
approach for statistical analysis, spanning thousands and millions of repeated simulations. A 
DAA integrator can present a strong safety case by developing a framework for simulating the 
encounter between a UAS and a manned aircraft, and then repeatedly analyzing the performance 
of each DAA sensor, the aircraft, and the environment to prove the efficacy of the DAA solution. 
An example of such a simulation framework can be seen in Figure 3.1, which was provided to 
industry and regulators by MIT LL’s team. 
 
Figure 3.1 Example Monte Carlo Framework Provided by MIT LL. Figure credit to 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
 
15 
MIT LL’s framework consists of taking raw track data from airspace across the 
Continental United States (CONUS) and drawing statistical inferences about the behavior of 
manned aircraft within each altitude layer, airspace class, and geographical location (Andrew 
Weinart). The result of the track processing is the encounter models that have been made mostly 
open source to the UAS community. The intent is to use the encounter models as well as the 
dynamic model of the aircraft and its respective sensor models within a fast-time simulation. 
These fast-time simulations take the pairs of ownship and intruder trajectories, referred to as 
encounters with a larger set of pairs deemed an encounter set, and iteratively analyze the ability 
of the ownship to maintain well clear of the intruding aircraft. As previously mentioned, the RR 
is one of the results of these fast-time simulations. MIT LL also provides an open-source 
simulation environment specific to DAA applications called DAA Evaluation of Guidance, 
Alerting, and Surveillance (DEGAS). This simulator is also a Monte-Carlo simulation but also 
includes pilot models and an interface with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 
(NASA) open source Detect-and-AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(DAIDALUS).  
3.1.2 Terminal Airspace Encounter Data Set 
MIT LL developed a statistical representation of manned aircraft trajectories in terminal, 
near airports, airspace. The resulting data set has been made available to those in the UAS world 
on their GitHub page. The two million sampled trajectories encompass one million total 
encounters between unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft in near-airport terminal airspace. The 
model focuses on UAS on a straight-in approach to a Class D airport. The data set includes 
encounters during takeoff and landing with a general aviation manned aircraft. Generally, the 
MIT LL Bayesian networks create individual trajectories and then pair them down the pipeline 
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for generating encounters. This data set, however, explicitly models two aircraft for each 
encounter. After downloading and transferring the data set to a MATLAB environment, the 
following figures were made to represent the starting locations of both the ownship UAS and 
manned intruder. The effect of generating UAS trajectories based on straight-in approaches can 
be seen in Figure 3.4, where the starting point of the UAS is commonly in line with the airport 
approach. Below, the terminal area where this data set was generated can be seen. 
 
Figure 3.2 Airport used in the Generation of Terminal Data Set Encounters. Satellite Image of 
the Airfield (left) and SkyVector Sectional (right) 
Laurence G Hanscom Field, FAA airport designation KBED, has two runways. One 
runway allows aircraft to takeoff and land from either 290 degrees heading with respect to north, 
or 110 degrees heading depending on the active direction. The other runway allows for 230 
degrees and 50 degrees. These directions explain why the UAS trajectories are heavily skewed to 
those directions with respect to the airport and why there is inconsistency in the density of the 




Figure 3.3 Scatter Plot of Intruder Aircraft Starting Positions 
The consistency of the intruder starting point density across the terminal airspace with a 
roughly five-mile radius can be seen in Figure 3.3. This consistency differs from the UAS 
ownship starting positions because of the difference in how MIT LL generated these trajectories. 
Since, the UAS was intent-driven in landing or taking off from the airport located within this 
bubble of airspace, the starting positions naturally tend to align with the airport shown previously 




Figure 3.4 Starting position of UAS ownship in encounter set 
Overall, the data set represents a statistically significant representation of what UAS 
approaches to a Class D Terminal airspace may look like, and the data set pairs these trajectories 
with manned aircraft meant to come within a reasonable range of the UAS ownship over the 
length of the encounter. 
3.1.2.2 Example File 
An example intruder file taken from this terminal data set is shown below in Table 3.1. 
An example ownship file taken from this data set is shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.1 Intruder Encounter File Data. 
 
time_s  speed_ftps relhdg_rad roll_rad  pitch_rad  accel_ftpss x_ft  y_ft  alt_ft  vx_ftps  vy_ftps  vz_ftps  turnrate_radps lat_deg  lon_deg
0 216.9709 1.040896 0 0 0 -2433.78 -31620.8 2030.543 109.6673 187.215 0 0 42.46319 -71.4046
1 216.9709 1.031238 -0.16463 0 0 -2323.69 -31433.8 2030.543 111.0632 186.3903 -9.7E-05 -0.02186 42.46349 -71.4039
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Table 3.2 Ownship Encounter File Data. 
 
 
The data available for either aircraft, from left to right with respect to the above tables, is 
time in seconds, speed in feet per second, relative heading in radians, roll of the aircraft in 
radians, pitch in radians, acceleration in feet per second per second. The positional information is 
available in either normalized x-y-z coordinates in feet, or latitude and longitude in degrees. The 
velocity x, y, and z components are also available in feet per second. Last, in the third from the 
right column, the turn rate in radians per second is provided. All of this information about the 
trajectories can be used to represent an encounter between a UAS ownship and manned aircraft 
intruder in a terminal area. The latitude and longitude provided could potentially provide a 
relative range from the airport since the airport location is known. These two files are the inputs 
into the simulation described by this thesis. 
3.1.3 Monte Carlo Methods 
Physical experimentation inherently has limits including time and possibility. Not all 
scenarios in a non-deterministic problem can physically be tested. Mathematicians developed 
numerical solutions to make up for this limitation and produced several viable methods. One 
type of these methods is the Monte Carlo method. The intent of using the Monte Carlo method is 
to cover all possibilities of a non-deterministic problem within numerical simulations using the 
probability distribution functions for each variable likely to add a degree of freedom to the 
output. This method can input several variables with respective probabilities and output an 
approximate solution for the problem. 
time_s  speed_ftps relhdg_rad roll_rad  pitch_rad  accel_ftpss x_ft  y_ft  alt_ft  vx_ftps  vy_ftps  vz_ftps  turnrate_radps lat_deg  lon_deg
0 162.5273 -0.08458 0 0 0 -18873.8 1520.564 743.9129 161.9463 -13.7308 0 0 42.41814 -71.2818




Figure 3.5 Monte Carlo Method passing three diverse probability distributions through a 
model to output a solution with standard deviation and a reliability curve. 
(Wittwer, 2004) 
In this thesis, a simplistic approach to applying Monte Carlo methods to the fast-time 
simulations mentioned in Figure 3.5 is implemented. Other than the trajectories, speeds, and 
altitudes, the basic sensor model representing the radar array is made variable through applying a 
normal distribution to the probabilities of detection and error when tracking an intruder. This 
approach is made simply for demonstrating how others may utilize the large encounter set for 
validating their systems and is not to be an accurate representation of hardware modelling within 
simulation. 
3.1.4 DAIDALUS 
DAIDALUS takes a novel approach at providing the autopilot with safe maneuvers to 
escape a potential loss of well clear. The algorithm generates multiple outputs including levels of 
alerting guidance and trajectories, called bands, meant to provide safe maneuvering of the 
ownship to avoid intruder aircraft. This thesis research will utilize the core concepts of 
DAIDALUS’ kinematic approach to alerting guidance and maneuver suggestion, without fully 
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interfacing the actual source code. In Figure 3.6, the core concept of the DAIDALUS algorithm 
is displayed. The possible trajectories the ownship could take are represented by paths and 
arrows. The region where the well-clear volume is predicted to be violated is shaded. The 
maximum turn angles for either direction are represented by α and β. A more detailed overview 
of NASA’s DAIDALUS algorithm is presented in (NASA). 
 
Figure 3.6 NASA’s DAIDALUS algorithm visualizing possible safe trajectories in an 
encounter with an intruder aircraft. 
For this research, an initial and singular kinematic projection of an intruder’s future path 
is utilized. Important to note is the effect of wind on the intruder aircraft is neglected. This means 
the initial speed and heading are initial conditions to the simple kinematic equations below, 
where 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖, and 𝑧𝑖 are the initial positions in Cartesian coordinates, 𝑥𝑓, 𝑦𝑓, and 𝑧𝑓 are the final 
positions, and 𝑣𝑥, 𝑣𝑦, and 𝑣𝑧 are the current measured velocities of both the ownship and 
intruder. Time is represented by the variable 𝑡 and spans 35 seconds in one-second intervals. 
 





𝑦𝑓 = 𝑣𝑦𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖 
(3.2) 
𝑧𝑓 = 𝑣𝑧𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖 
(3.3) 
 
During the simulation, after the sensors have established a track for the intruder, the 
closest point of approach is estimated using the future state information output from the above 
kinematic equations. If the estimated future distance between the ownship and intruder is 
expected to reach less than 2,000 ft, then a maneuver is calculated for the ownship. This 
maneuver is calculated using the ownship’s current heading and assumes a constant rate of 
change in heading. Similar to the DAIDALUS algorithm, the possible avoidance maneuvers span 
from left to right in one-degree increments with respect to the current direction of the ownship’s 
nose. When no avoidance maneuver is deemed safe, the simulation chooses a random avoidance 
band to follow. Future work should include the interfacing of the NASA C++ source code for 
DAIDALUS with MATLAB. 
3.1.5 Encounter Set Metadata 
Considering that any encounter set can be generated by anyone who runs MIT LL’s open-
source encounter generator, there must be a standard for metadata describing each encounter set. 
Hypothetically, any DAA integrator could randomly generate one million encounters that do not 
stress test their models and algorithms the same way that one of the encounter sets made 
available by MIT LL does. Therefore, it would be important for regulators to consider that any 
two million generated trajectories do fall within a limited mean and distribution but are not 
identical to other sets. One way of determining the robustness of any single encounter set is to 
identify important metadata that can provide insight into the volatility of the encounters that must 
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be simulated against. This section discusses some possible metadata that could be used to aid 
regulators in determining important qualities of an encounter set as well as to inform those 
intending to use encounter set generators for DAA simulation. 
3.1.5.1 Risk Ratios 
The intent of simulating any DAA system and algorithm pair is to generate an evaluation 
of the risk associated with a UAS flying in the NAS. Regulators have worked to establish 
acceptable percentage risk in the form of RRs as discussed previously. More specifically, the 
encounter set inherently has a percentage of encounters that result in a loss of adequate self-
separation. The RR for LoWC can be calculated for each encounter, and an overall encounter 
set-wide RR for LoWC and NMAC can be established as the baseline performance metric for the 
DAA simulation. If the overall RR of an encounter set is very small, then the encounter set can 
be considered not viable for suitably testing the DAA system by simulation. However, near 
losses of self-separation could be of particular interest when evaluating probabilities of detection 
and false tracks.  
For this research, the MIT LL’s first publicly available one million encounters trained by 
a Terminal Airspace data set were used. The RRs were assessed for the entirety of the set using 
the lowest value for absolute range between the intruder and ownship over the entire encounter. 
To violate Well Clear, both the vertical offset and horizontal offset needed to less than the self-
separation threshold. If the intruder simply passed directly over the ownship but at a difference in 
altitude exceeding the vertical threshold, then the encounter was said to not violate the self-
separation threshold. There are drawbacks to this approach that will not be within the scope of 
this research. Generally, a DAA algorithm will make a forecasted trajectory for the intruder after 
a track has been established. In many instances, that trajectory may predict a loss of self-
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separation in the future, but the intruder may turn prematurely due to the preestablished Bayes 
trajectory thus avoiding the ownship’s airspace. For this research, this type of scenario was 
neglected for establishing the baseline RRs. Therefore, the RRs for the encounter set were as 
shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Risk Ratios for Loss of Well Clear and Near Mid-Air Collision for Terminal 
Airspace Encounter Set without Mitigation. 
Risk Ratio Type Value 





3.1.5.2 Closest Point of Approach 
The Closest Point of Approach (CPA) is simply the minimum distance between two 
aircraft within any encounter for the whole length of the encounter. This distance can be 
calculated as the absolute range between the two aircraft, taking their x-y-z positions and 
calculating range as simply as below. Generally, the CPA has a horizontal and vertical 
component, but the below equation represents the closest absolute distance between aircraft 
during an encounter. 
 
𝑐𝑝𝑎 = √((𝑥𝑜𝑤𝑛 − 𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡)2 + (𝑦𝑜𝑤𝑛 − 𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡)2 + (𝑧𝑜𝑤𝑛 − 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡)2) 
 (3.4) 
 
For this terminal data set, the following histogram in Figure 3.7 represents the CPA for 
all one million encounters between a UAS and manned aircraft in a simulated terminal airspace 




Figure 3.7 Closest Point of Approach for One Million Unmitigated Encounters between an 
Unmanned Aircraft and a Manned Aircraft near Class D Terminal Airspace. 
 
3.1.5.3 Horizontal and Vertical Miss Distances 
Given the CPA is known from the previous section, then two important metrics may be 
calculated. The Horizontal Miss Distance (HMD) and Vertical Miss Distance (VMD) are 
representations of how close two aircraft get within the length of an encounter. Although a HMD 
may reach less than the horizontal self-separation threshold, the intruder aircraft could still have 
an adequate vertical offset resulting in a non-violation. Similarly, the difference in altitude 
between aircraft may even reach zero, but not at a point within the encounter that is meaningful 
for safety assessment. To accurately capture the closeness of aircraft within an encounter, both 
the HMD and VMD must be calculated. These calculated distances are simply the horizontal 
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distance and vertical distances at the point of closest approach. The HMD and VMD are plotted 
in Figure 3.8 for the given MIT LL Terminal Class D encounter set. 
 
Figure 3.8 Scatter plot of Horizontal Miss Distance in feet on the horizontal axis and Vertical 
Miss Distance in feet on the vertical axis. 
 
3.2 Simulation Framework 
The following section details the process flow of the rudimentary kinematic simulation 
for the terminal data set. MATLAB source code may be found in Appendix A at the end of this 
document. Key to note is this simulation is not representative of a robust simulation solution for 
validating DAA systems integrated with UAS as such a simulation would require models for 
noise, ground clutter, false tracks, empirical data models, etc. This simulation simply serves to 
demonstrate to future DAA integrators tools like the Terminal Class D airspace data set. Future 
 
27 
integrators must consider variables like system timing, airspace clutter, classification of tracks 
and other important concepts to develop their own simulation framework worthy of validating an 
aircraft operating BVLOS in the NAS. 
In this section, the sensor model is introduced. This model represents a perfect detect and 
track radar array spanning 270 degrees and a range of 4,000 feet. Next, the detection, prediction, 
and avoidance methodologies are presented. Each of these methodologies have inherent 
functions that calculate important parameters to be passed along to the next function within the 
simulation. In Figure 3.9, the simulation flow diagram is visualized with a start oval in green and 
an end oval in red. The processes that occur within the simulation are represented by light blue 
rectangles with the function name inside. Any decisions or conditionals are represented by 
yellow diamonds with the output yes or no pointing to the respective next step. This simulation 
pipeline may be a building block for future simulations that may include more realistic sensor 
models and aircraft dynamics. The topic of future improvement is discussed in the future 





Figure 3.9 Detect-and-Avoid Simulation Flow Diagram. 
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3.2.2 Sensor Model 
This simulation involves a simulated three panel radar array treated as a homogeneous 
system, scanning every one second for a FOV of 270 degrees total. The radar array is centered 
with respect to down the nose of the UAS, offering 135 degrees FOV on either side of the 
aircraft. The remaining 90 degrees is not accounted for by any sensor or method meaning any 
perfect overtake scenario would result in a loss of well clear every time it is simulated. The value 
chosen for maximum range of detection and tracking is 4,000 feet. This value comes from being 
twice the range of the WCV, giving the ownship 2,000 feet to determine and execute an evasive 
maneuver to avoid losing self-separation and is also influenced by the available specifications 
from both radar manufacturers described in Chapter 2. The sensor array’s accuracy and 
probability of detection are based on simple statistical distributions. The probability of detection 
is based on a function of range that yields a 10 percent probability of detecting an intruder once 
that intruder is within the FOV and 4,000 feet of the ownship. The below equation was used as it 
increases exponentially as the range between the two aircraft decrease. 
𝑃(𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡) = 𝑒−0.0005756∗𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒  (3.4) 
 
This exponential function for probability of detecting an intruder within the ownship’s 
FOV is not based on any empirical data or conclusions from real data. An integrator would need 
to conduct bench testing of their DAA sensors and then determine an appropriate model for 




Figure 3.10 Plot of radar detection based on range. Range values are on the horizontal axis in 
feet and detection probability between 0 and 100 percent are on the vertical axis.  
Figure 3.10 visualizes the curve for probability of detection. At the well clear horizontal 
boundary at 2,000 feet, the radar array has a 32 percent chance of detecting an intruder. A 
uniform random distribution function, rand() within MATLAB, gets called and if the value 
returned is less than or equal to the probability yielded by the above equation, then the detection 
function returns a track with accuracy determined by the next step. 
Radar performance should be captured as probable error in azimuth, elevation, and range 
based on environmental conditions and radar cross sections of the target. In this rudimentary 
simulation, radar performance was not considered to this level of detail, rather a function was 
created to take two concepts into account. First, the accuracy of the detected track increases as 
the range between the ownship and intruder decreases. Second, a counter variable is made to 
capture how many times the sensor has detected that same track. In a robust simulation, state-
space estimation filters like Kalman Filters can be used to generate probable next states of an 
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aircraft based on sensor data in real-time. To represent this crudely, as that counter variable goes 
up, the accuracy of the obtained track increases. This means encounters where the intruder is 
well within the FOV of the ownship and is considered detectable by the previous probability of 
detection methodology, then as the encounter progresses, the accuracy of the detected track will 
increase so long as the intruder does not leave the FOV. 
This sensor model is not representative of real hardware modelling and is not meant to be 
followed for DAA integrators. Variations in system timing is not accounted for in this sensor 
model but should be for those simulating DAA integration. The intent of including a very 
rudimentary and ideal sensor model is to demonstrate the use case of encounter simulation for 
validating a DAA system and should not be followed step-by-step. The sensor model and 
associated detection and prediction methodologies are only to provide a more introspective look 
into how the encounter sets can be simulated rather than simply flying the UAS blind to its 
airspace and unresponsive to well clear violations. 
3.2.3 Detection Methodology 
The methodology for detection within this particular rudimentary encounter simulation is 
as follows. After the state space of the ownship and intruder are updated every iteration, a 
function is called to determine if the ownship is in the correct orientation to be able to see the 
intruder based on the sensor model’s parameters of FOV and detectable range. Once that 
function is called, if it returns a detect intruder track, then the prediction methodology is 
followed. If no track is returned from the detection function, then the simulation advances an 
iteration without further function calls. 
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3.2.4 Prediction Methodology 
Once the detection function is called and returns a track, then a few functions are called 
upon to provide a kinematic prediction of the intruder track based on the current detected 
component velocities, heading, and turn rates of the intruder track. The amount of look ahead 
time for the prediction can be changed in the user inputs object. Higher look ahead times will 
provide a constant curvature trajectory that may form a circle if the intruder track’s turn rate is 
significant at time of detection. The future state of the ownship is similarly calculated to help 
inform the avoidance function. 
3.2.5 Avoidance Methodology 
The avoidance function is only called upon if the prediction function determines a future 
loss of well clear given a predicted ownship and intruder trajectory. There is no optimization 
present in this rudimentary simulation as the chosen avoidance maneuver is taken from a list of 
bands that are predicted to not lose self-separation, and if none of these exist, then a random 
maneuver is chosen from the list. Future research may include incorporating the actual C++ code 
for NASA’s DAIDALUS with this simulation to provide a better look at how that algorithm 
chooses an optimal avoidance maneuver. Once an avoidance maneuver is passed along to the 
next step in the simulation, the ownship will follow that maneuver and then that single encounter 
simulation will end. 
3.3 Simulation Results 
The following section visualizes some of the results of the one million encounter set 
simulation. The simulation ran three separate times on an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 3960x CPU 
with Asus Prime TRX40-PRO AMD 3rd Gen Ryzen Threadripper Strx4 ATX Motherboard and 
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Corsair Vengeance 256 GB (8x32) of physical RAM over the course of approximately one hour 
for each run.  
Based on the kinematic simulation described, there was an average of 84,351 losses of 
well clear and 3,660 near mid-air collisions. Compared to the previously described unmitigated 
or base RR values, this is a 2.16% reduction in losses of well clear and a 0.0034% decrease in 
near mid-air collisions. Relative to the base values, that corresponds to a 20.4% decrease in 
losses of well clear by mitigation and a 8.5% decrease in near mid-air collisions by mitigation. 
These simulations assumed perfect sensor knowledge and only one maneuver after detecting a 
future self-separation violation. These numbers would be further mitigated with a more robust 
DAA algorithm and sensor, as well as multiple updates to the avoidance calculations. Table 3.4 
shows the respective RRs for the one million encounters simulated. 
Table 3.4 Mitigated Risk Ratios over one million encounters in Terminal Class D airspace. 
Risk Ratio Type Value 





Although RR values have been put in draft standards for DAA sensors and systems, there 
has not been a set of universally recognized values. Each airspace authority tends to operate 
differently, and the level of risk may be different across countries or even states. UAS integrators 
of DAA technologies must look to standardizing bodies like American Society of Testing and 
Materials (ASTM) and Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) for the release of 
official standards that may be accepted by the FAA. These organizations work alongside industry 
experts and regulators to compromise what will be the status quo for UAS integrators. 
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3.3.2 Terminal Airspace Encounter Examples 
The following section provides some example figures of pairs of ownship and intruder 
trajectories that were used as inputs to the overall fast-time encounter simulation. Intruder tracks 
are marked in red and ownship tracks are marked in yellow for this section only. The starting 
point of both the ownship and intruder are marked with boxes and arrows pointing to the tracks’ 
first position. All four examples of two aircraft encountering one another are from MIT LL’s 
Terminal Class D airspace data set available on their encounter model overview at 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
 
Figure 3.11 Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. Ownship trajectory 





Figure 3.12 Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. Ownship trajectory 
marked in yellow and intruder trajectory marked in red. 
 
 




Figure 3.14 Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. 
 
3.3.3 Detect, Predict, and Avoid Examples 
The following figures show a few examples of the sensor detecting an intruder and 
calculating ownship and intruder projected trajectories. For the length of this section, the blue 
lines are ownship trajectories, the red lines are intruder trajectories, the cyan dashed lines are 
predicted arcs of future intruder tracks, and the light-yellow dashed lines are predicted ownship 
trajectories. Red scattered circles along the intruder’s trajectory are visualizations of the DAA 





Figure 3.15 Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. Ownship trajectory 
marked in blue and intruder trajectory marked in red. In this case, the intruder 
came within the FOV of the sensor and predictions for both intruder, cyan dashes, 
and ownship, yellow dashes, were generated. 
An example of an encounter with the sensor at perfect performance can be seen in Figure 
3.15. The unmanned aircraft’s trajectory is marked in blue, and the manned aircraft is in red. The 
red circles along the intruder’s path represent when the intruder was detected by the DAA sensor 
without error, and the subsequent circles are the location of the intruder that is input into the 
kinematic prediction that is called every iteration and is in the cyan hyphenated curved lines. In 
contrast, Figure 3.16 below shows an encounter with the sensor error in detection being added to 
the simulation. The variation in distance between the red circles is due to the lower probability of 
detection and higher probability of error in the intruder’s true location as the intruder enters the 
detectable range of the ownship’s sensors. As the encounter moves forward, the detections 
become more consistent as the two aircraft get closer. The ownship’s predicted paths are marked 
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by magenta hyphenated curves, and the intruder’s in cyan hyphenated curves. The consistent 
cluster of red circles toward the end of the encounter are due to the range between aircraft 
decreasing and the number of previous detections of the intruder aircraft increasing. 
 
Figure 3.16 Two aircraft trajectories in an intercepting encounter within terminal airspace. 
Intruder path in red, and ownship path in blue. After each detection of the intruder, 
the predicted path of the ownship, in magenta hyphenated curves, and the 




DAA SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The following section describes the research done to integrate a three-panel radar array 
with a Group 3 UAS. The overall system of systems is described along with each subsystem’s 
role in the DAA function. The hardware integration including the radar panel array, mission 
computer, and autopilot are described next. Last, the software integration encompasses the radar 
control code in C++ including the additional masking function based upon altitude, the 
functional inputs and outputs of the DAIDALUS DAA algorithm, and finally an overview of the 
previously described functions visualized by a communications flow diagram.  
4.1 System of Systems 
An unmanned aircraft consists of multiple subsystems that contribute to the overall 
operation of the vehicle. The pilot may be on-the-loop, meaning responsible for maintaining the 
mission, in-the-loop, meaning an active contributor to the controls, or out-of-the-loop. The pilot 
is still a subsystem included in the overall system of systems no matter their role, active or 
passive. The autopilot is a key system onboard the aircraft. Outside of the pilot’s inputs, the 
autopilot actively reads and writes to the necessary controls to operate the aircraft. Global 
Positioning System (GPS) signal, Attitude Heading and Reference System (AHRS) outputs, and 
other navigation devices all communicate with the autopilot. Each subsystem, redundant or not, 




Any DAA sensor integrated with the existing UAS framework must work with the other 
subsystems to enable BVLOS capabilities. The DAA integrator must understand the downstream 
effects the DAA sensor has on the other functions. The physical hardware that scans the airspace 
for targets serves the detect function as described in subsection 3.1. In the following section, the 
mission computer must provide both the autopilot and pilot with an alert to acknowledge the 
presence of a target output by the detect function. Last, the mission computer and autopilot 
coordinate to conduct a maneuver if required to maintain self-separation from an intruder in the 
ownship’s airspace. The systems responsible for each of these subroutines are detailed in the 
following subsections. 
4.1.1 Detect Function 
The time that a DAA sensor spends scanning its FOV directly contributes to the efficacy 
of the detect function. If a sensor has a large FOV and low scanning rate, then the DAA system 
integrator must account for the lack of frequent updates to the downstream alert and avoid 
functions. For example, suppose a DAA system has a wide FOV with only a 1 Hz update rate. 
For every scan, a head-on intruder may close the distance between itself and the ownship by 
hundreds of feet. Therefore, downstream functions like the alert and avoid functions should be 
wary of the uncertainty of the track information. On the contrary, if a DAA system has a high 
update rate, then the DAA system integrator should be careful not to inundate the subsequent 
functions with large amounts of track data that may slow the overall DAA function. In the 




4.1.2 Alert Function 
The alert function encompasses the necessary distribution of intruder track information, 
predicted intruder flight path, and overall safety risk to the avoid function. The alert function is 
solely responsible for quantifying or qualifying the potential risk an intruder poses to the 
ownship by providing the enabling switches to the avoid function. Many DAA algorithms use a 
scale of integers to describe the potential risk of an intruder’s predicted flight path. The NASA 
DAIDALUS algorithm provides a scale of numbers that reflect this risk. For a UAS operator to 
understand the DAA function’s outputs, an alert level may be transmitted to the autopilot and/or 
GCS as part of the alert function. 
The second output of the alert function must be some form of relative airspace awareness 
to the operator. This may be in the form of an updated airspace picture in the form of a GUI that 
gives the operator an easily understandable relative location of the intruder. By both providing 
the subsequent avoid function with the necessary alert level, as well as visualizing the potential 
threat, the alert function is key to the success of any BVLOS operation. 
4.1.3 Avoid Function 
Finally, once the airspace has been scanned for intruders by the detect function, and the 
intruder’s potential risk has been communicated by the alert function, then the avoid function 
may be called upon to deescalate any encounter. The avoid function may be broken down to 
three simple tasks. First, the avoid function encapsulates the calculation of trajectories that can 
avoid losing self-separation with an intruder. Second, the necessary inputs to the autopilot are 
made via the avoid function to begin the avoidance maneuver. 
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4.2 Hardware Integration 
Integrators of DAA technology with existing UAS platforms face many challenges. For 
UAS already struggling with meeting flight time requirements, the addition of power consuming 
and heavy DAA sensor suites may make the use case futile. Generally, this setback would 
eliminate airborne DAA sensors for those UAS not capable of bearing the extra burden. 
However, for large UAS greater than 55 pounds maximum Gross Takeoff Weight (MGTOW), 
there is generally room for multiple payloads including DAA technologies. In this research, the 
large UAS worked on had a sufficient power budget and the total DAA sensor array installation 
did not weigh enough in comparison to the MGTOW of the UAS to see these negative effects.  
The following section describes the hardware and software integration of a three-panel 
radar array onto the nose of a Group 3 UAS. A simple method was created to help clear noise 
from ground clutter in the form of altitude masking. The DAA algorithm DAIDALUS was 
integrated with the system of systems to provide the avoidance maneuver functionality to be 
included in future research. 
4.2.1 Radar Array 
The hardware integration predominantly consisted of mounting a three-panel radar array 
to the nose of the large UAS. The orientation of the radar array can be seen in Figure 4.1. The 
left and right radars have a 75-degree angular offset from the middle one. It can be assumed that 
each radar has 120-degree azimuth coverage, given that both models of flat panel radars 
described in the DAA technology section of this document share this common specification. A 
reasonable range of 4,000 feet was determined given the specifications supplied by both of these 





Figure 4.1 Radar array total coverage with two regions, marked 2 and 4 respectively, covered 
redundantly on either side of the nose. 
 
Doing some simple angle calculations, the total azimuth coverage comes out to 
approximately 270 degrees. This totals to 75% of the total possible azimuth coverage of 360 
degrees. Since the radars are faced forward, the 90-degree blind spot behind the large UAS must 
be covered by procedural mitigations or the addition of rearward facing DAA technologies, even 
though overtake encounters are unlikely. For the intent of this research, the blind spot is not 
accounted for as future integration will involve covering this area. 
4.3 Software Integration 
A three-radar array was installed and integrated with in-house software and proprietary 
APIs. The software presented was flown in a flight test and produced promising results in the 
areas of communication and overall information flow. The following section overviews the work 





4.3.1 Software Overview 
To help with explaining the integration work done, several diagrams are presented to 
visualize the flow of communications between the existing and added systems on the Group 3 
UAS. The radar control software will not be detailed in this document due to the potential 
leaking of proprietary information.In Figure 4.2, the flow between onboard autopilot, radar array 
communications, the DAA algorithm, and finally the Graphical User Interface (GUI) is 
visualized. In this architecture the autopilot provides telemetry and timing information to the 
radar array communications and DAA algorithm C++ software. This information includes GPS 
latitude, longitude and altitude as this information is used by both pieces of software. Down the 
line, the radar array provides a look at the airspace to the GUI and the DAA algorithm provides 
suggested alert levels and avoidance maneuvers in a visual manner to the pilot. Pilot-in-the-loop 
software testing of this GUI has not been performed to evaluate effects like clutter and loading of 
extra work on the pilot, but these tests should be considered by future integrators. 
 





Figure 4.3 Software architecture overview for DAA sensor array. 
4.3.2 Radar Control 
A C++ Application Programming Interface (API) was provided by the radar 
manufacturer in order to facilitate the integration of the radar array with the existing systems on 
the UAS. This API was integrated with the DAIDALUS algorithm and some autopilot 
communications and control algorithms to create a control software. The details of this software 
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and how it functions are not within the scope of this thesis, however a high-level process flow is 
provided in Figure 4.3. 
4.3.2.1 Altitude Masking 
Even ground-based radar arrays can be bogged down by false tracks due to ground 
clutter. Airborne radar arrays experience this misinformation on a generally larger scale due to 
the vibration and movement of the platform that the sensors are mounted to. To help combat the 
effect of trees, low flying birds, large vehicles passing, and other sources of ground clutter, an 
altitude masking algorithm was added to the software integration. This algorithm simply took a 
feedback loop approach to modifying where the radars needed to gather track data. The above 
ground level altitude of the ownship was an input to the altitude mask command, and an 
additional buffer of 50 feet was added to it. This masking technique helped to eliminate some of 
the ground clutter, but still sources of clutter due to weather and higher-flying aviaries needs to 
be added to the software integration. These methods are a possible source of future work for this 





RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Future DAA Technology 
As the current landscape of commercially available DAA sensor technologies advances, 
the survey of DAA sensors within this document will become less encompassing. Future updates 
to the list and specifications of the technologies explored will need to be made to capture the 
growing pool of industry stakeholders that may be developing DAA sensors currently. This 
research may be used as a starting point for future surveys into this sector of unmanned aviation 
technology and may never be truly representative of every commercially available and private 
product. 
5.2 Simulation Gaps 
The simulation presented here is predominantly focused on being a tool for exposing the 
availability of various public databases of aircraft trajectories. This thesis does not contain 
empirical DAA sensor performance data even though the radar array spoken of was physically 
integrated, flight tested, and performance data were acquired. UAS integrators must collect 
empirical sensor and platform performance data to model and put into their fast-time simulation 
environments. One possible method would be to flight test several encounter geometries and 
collect radar performance data based on Radar Cross Section (RCS) range, azimuth, and 
elevation for radar-type sensors. Once the integrator collected adequate data, that performance 
model could be an input to the fast-time simulations to provide a more robust understanding of 
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the impact DAA sensor performance has on the unmanned system’s ability to maintain well clear 
through variances based on a model including mean performance and standard deviation values. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The research done as part of this thesis covers the simulation, integration, and field 
testing of a three-radar array installation onboard a Group 3 UAS platform1. The technology 
survey presented will only increase with the positive forward momentum from regulating bodies, 
allowing more industry players to soundly invest in this market. A kinematic simulation based on 
very simplified kinematics has been presented as a reference for future integrators. The 
simulation determined that the addition of a 270-degree sensor with a probability of detection set 
to 10 percent at 4,000 feet and increasing exponentially with the decrease in range to have a 
positive effect on the ability of a UAS to detect and promptly avoid intruding aircraft in the 
described terminal airspace dataset . An overview of the hardware and software installation is 
also detailed. As this research moves forward, additional technical and procedural mitigations 
will be emplaced both in practice and in simulation to further the comprehensive safety case for 
flying an unmanned Group 3 platform beyond the visual capabilities of the operator. This thesis 
research serves as one of many steppingstones toward that fruitful goal for the unmanned sector 
of aviation, and given the future research suggested here, there will be plenty of work to be done. 
  
 
1 The three-radar array DAA sensor suite was flight tested and promising results for the future of this research were 
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Author: Kyle Ryker  
Last Updated Date: 9 June 2021  
Overview: The following is a very simple kinematic simulation script that works with several 
function and class files. The user can input several simulation parameters that may change the 
output of the simulation. The overall purpose of the simulation script is to provide a very simple 
way to evaluate a DAA Sensor against the Terminal Airspace data set provided by 











A for-loop is used here because there are 1,000 '.mat' files named 'EncounterFilexxx.mat' where 
xxx is a number from 1 to 1,000. Each encounter file contains 1,000 sets of two trajectories for 
simulation, therefore a total of 1,000,000 overall. This outer for-loop is to go through each '.mat' 













Published with MATLAB® R2020a 
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A.2 User Inputs Class 
 




A.3 predictKinTrack function 
 




A.4 loadEncounterFile Function 
 




A.5 dtmLoWC Function 
 




A.6 checkProbDetection Function 
 
Published with MATLAB® R2020a 




Published with MATLAB® R2020a 
A.8 addSensorError Function 




A.9 checkBands Function 
Published with MATLAB® R2020a  
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A.10 calcRelHdg Function 




A.11 calcKinBands Function 







OPEN-SOURCE TOOLS FOR UAS INTEGRATORS 
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B.1 MIT Lincoln Laboratory Datasets 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory has been developing several 
datasets over the past decade. A few of these datasets capture air traffic over the continental 
United States (CONUS). The first set is the Traffic Density Database (Edwards). The air traffic 
data captured covers hundreds of thousands of flight hours at all altitudes able to be seen by a 
long-range radar network across the CONUS. Work done to filter and extract aircraft models 
from the CONUS radar data can be read in (M.J. Kochenderfer). In Figure B.1, the total 
coverage by the radar network is displayed.  
 
Figure B.1 Total radar coverage of the Continental United States included within the Traffic 
Density Database. 
The database can be accessed via the MIT Lincoln Laboratory’s MATLAB software 
available on their GitHub. The data can be filtered by altitude to give UAS integrators relevant 
encounter probability information for their potential operations. 
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The other available database by MIT Lincoln Laboratory is the ADS-B OpenSky 
Network (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Since the radar-based network previously 
discussed could not capture low altitudes away from terminal airspace, MIT Lincoln Laboratory 
reached out to the community to crowdsource an ADS-B receiver network. Example ADS-B 
tracks for a fixed-wing manned aircraft is shown below. 
 
Figure B.2 Track segments for a fixed-wing multi-engine FAA (USA) registered aircraft in 
the NAS taken from MIT Lincoln Laboratory’s OpenSky Network GitHub. 
UAS Integrators may use these available databases to create comprehensive safety cases 
specific to the airspace they wish to fly in. Encounter probability can be estimated for various 
altitudes and with the OpenSky Network, these estimates can be applicable to lower altitudes not 
covered by the radar network. 
B.2 MIT Lincoln Laboratory Bayesian Network Models 
Part of the work done by MIT Lincoln Laboratory was to create models of how pilots and 
aircraft behave based on variables such as airspace, altitude, and aircraft type. To do so, MIT 
Lincoln Laboratory used a Bayesian network approach to determining a sufficient and 
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statistically representative model for their behavior. These statistical networks can generate 
millions of trajectories that are based on real world flight data. A table of the various types of 
models of aircraft and unconventional air vehicles available for track generation is listed below. 
More information on the models can be found on their GitHub post titled em-model-manned-
bayes. 
Table B.1 Types of aircraft models, both conventional and unconventional, provided by MIT 
Lincoln Laboratory’s GitHub. 
Model Description (Version) Altitude Scope 
correlated Aircraft squawking a Mode 3A/C discrete code over the 
CONUS (v1.1) 
[1000, Inf] 
correlated Aircraft squawking a Mode 3A/C discrete code (v2.1) [1000, Inf] 
uncorrelated Aircraft squawking Mode 3A/C of 1200 over the CONUS 
(v1.0) 
Surrogate for conventional aircraft without transponders 
[500, 18000] 
uncorrelated Aircraft squawking Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v2.x) 
Surrogate for conventional aircraft without transponders 
[500, 18000] 
correlated Aircraft squawking Mode 3A/C of 1200 over littoral 
regions (v1.0) 
[500, 18000] 
uncorrelated Aircraft squawking a Mode 3A/C discrete code over 
littoral regions (v1.0) 
[1000, 45000] 
uncorrelated Fixed wing multi-engine with ADS-B Out not squawking 
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2) 
[50, 5000] 
uncorrelated Fixed wing multi-engine with ADS-B Out squawking 
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2) 
Surrogate for conventional aircraft without transponders 
[50, 5000] 
uncorrelated Fixed wing single-engine with ADS-B Out not squawking 
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2) 
[50, 5000] 
uncorrelated Fixed wing multi-single with ADS-B Out squawking 
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2) 




Table B.1 (continued) 
Model Description (Version) Altitude Scope 
uncorrelated Fixed wing multi-engine with ADS-B Out not squawking 
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2) 
[50, 5000] 
uncorrelated Rotorcraft with ADS-B Out squawking Mode 3A/C of 
1200 (v1.2) 
Surrogate for conventional aircraft without transponders 
[50, 5000] 
uncorrelated Rotorcraft with ADS-B Out (v1.0) [50, 5000] 
uncorrelated Fixed wing single-engine with ADS-B Out (v1.0) [50, 5000] 
uncorrelated Rotorcraft with ADS-B Out (v1.0) [50, 5000] 
uncorrelated Hot air balloons (v1.0) [0, 10000] 
uncorrelated Airships (v1.0) [0, 10000] 
uncorrelated Flexible wing hang gliders (v1.0) [0, 10000] 
uncorrelated Rigid wing hang gliders (v1.0) [0, 10000] 
uncorrelated Gliders (v1.0) [0, 10000] 
uncorrelated Paragliders (v1.0) [0, 10000] 
uncorrelated Paramotors (v1.0) [0, 10000] 
uncorrelated Skydivers (v1.0) [0, 15000] 




Table B.1 (continued) 
Model Description (Version) Altitude Scope 
due regard Aircraft participating in the ETMS (v1.0) (0, Inf] 
HAA Rotorcraft of a Massachusetts-based HAA operator (0, 5000] 
 
B.3 MIT Lincoln Laboratory Simulation Tools 
Last, MIT Lincoln Laboratory has developed several tools for simulating DAA systems. 
One of which is the DAA Evaluation of Guidance, Alerting, and Surveillance (DEGAS) 
simulator. This simulation framework uses MATLAB and Simulink to iterate through a Monte 
Carlo simulation of any DAA system. DEGAS is currently interfaceable with NASA’s 
DAIDALUS algorithm. More information about the simulation and the downloadable source 
code can be found on their GitHub page at https://github.com/mit-ll/degas-core. UAS integrators 
may use this simulation as a reference for designing DAA sensor simulations. 
 
